

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED

SEP 14 1978

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

78-442

NO. _____

OTM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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IN THE
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
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Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in the above entitled cause on May 8, 1978.

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW:

The opinion of the District Court, printed in Appendix A of the separate bound Appendix, apparently is unreported. The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is printed in Appendix B of the separate bound Appendix and is reported at 572 F.2d 1046.

JURISDICTION

1. The Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was dated May 8, 1978, and it was entered on the same day.
2. The Order overruling the Motion for Rehearing was dated June 27, 1978.
3. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1346.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Is the Government required under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 482, to allow as deductions to the petitioner the equipment rentals which petitioner paid to a related corporation (TIERCO) where the related corporation included these payments in its income?

STATUTES INVOLVED

The Statutes involved are Section 482 and Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. Sections 162 and 482. These sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are printed in Appendix C of the separate bound appendice.

STATEMENT

This is a civil action for the recovery of federal income taxes for the fiscal years ended September 30, 1955 through 1958.

The facts were stipulated in the Trial Court.

OTM Corporation, the petitioner, hereinafter called taxpayer, filed its claim for refund for the years at issue and took the position that it was entitled as deductions in computing its taxable income the equipment rentals which it paid to a related corporation, Texas Industrial Equipment Rental Company (TIERCO). The taxpayer's position was that under the provisions of Section 482 and the regulations thereunder that it was entitled to these equipment rentals as a business expense, since TIERCO had included these payments in its income.

In the Trial Court, the parties stipulated as to the reasonable rental value of

the equipment involved, and the taxpayer's income taxes were recomputed based on this stipulation and judgment was entered in favor of the taxpayer for the sum of \$45,754.00, which represented a refund of income taxes of \$17,474.00, negligence penalty of \$654.00 and interest at \$27,626.00. In connection with the stipulation, the taxpayer reserved the right to present to the Trial Court the legal issue of whether it was entitled to claim the rest of the rental which it paid TIERCO as a deduction since Internal Revenue Service had not reduced the rental income of TIERCO by the amount of the rent expense that Internal Revenue Service had disallowed to the taxpayer. Internal Revenue Service taxed to TIERCO the amount that taxpayer had paid it as rental income, but Internal Revenue Service did not allow the taxpayer a rental expense deduction for \$74,224.08 which it had paid TIERCO during the years

at issue.

The Trial Court ruled that Section 482 did not apply to this case but that Section 162 applied. Judgment was entered accordingly. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sustained the Trial Court.

Section 162 in general allows as a deduction only reasonable rental expenses.

The taxpayer's position is that Internal Revenue Service disallowed part of the rent which taxpayer paid to TIERCO, a related taxpayer, because Internal Revenue Service determined that the rents were not negotiated on an arm's length basis. This is an allocation of income or deductions among related taxpayers, and Section 482 applies. However, Internal Revenue Service did not reduce the rental income to TIERCO by the amount of the disallowed rents to the taxpayer even though the statute of limitations applicable to TIERCO had not expired at that time. Because of Internal Revenue

Service's own rulings and court decisions, Internal Revenue Service cannot disallow the rental deduction to the taxpayer, because they did not reduce TIERCO's income. The Government's position is that the rent was disallowed under Section 162 and that it was not required to make the correlative adjustment to TIERCO's income.

ARGUMENT

THE GOVERNMENT WAS REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, 26 U.S.C. 482, TO ALLOW AS DEDUCTIONS TO THE PETITIONER THE EQUIPMENT RENTALS WHICH THE PETITIONER PAID TO A RELATED CORPORATION (TIERCO) WHERE THE RELATED CORPORATION INCLUDED THOSE PAYMENTS IN ITS INCOME.

The issue is whether Section 482 or Section 162 applies. The taxpayer contends that Section 482 applies, whereas the Government contends that Section 162 is applicable.

Section 482 provides:

Sec. 482. Allocation of income and deductions among taxpayers.

In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distributions, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of

any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.

Section 162 provides:

Sec. 162. Trade or business expenses.

(a) In general.- There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including--

* * * *

(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.

* * * *

The taxpayer and TIERCO were related entities.

The purpose of Section 482 is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer by determining the true taxable income of the controlled taxpayer; Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1). The Commissioner has authority in determining the correct taxable income of the controlled

members to make such distributions, apportionments, or allocations as he may deem necessary of gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances, or of any item or element affecting taxable income, between the controlled taxpayers and the standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer; Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1). The appropriate adjustments may take the form of an increase or decrease in gross income, increase or decrease in deductions (including depreciation), or any other adjustment which may be appropriate under the circumstances; Reg. 1.482-1(d)(1). Whenever the Commissioner makes adjustments to the income of one member of a group of controlled taxpayers, he shall also make appropriate correlative adjustments to the income of any other member of the group involved in the allocation; Reg. 1.482-1(d)(2) (underscoring

supplied by taxpayer). An adjustment to reflect an arm's length rental charge for the use of the tangible property of a member of a controlled group is included in the provisions of Section 482; Reg. 1.482-1(d)(2), Example 1. Also see Reg. 1.482-2(c)(1) which says where one member uses the tangible property of the other member "without charge or at a charge which is not equal to an arm's length rental charge, the district director may make appropriate allocations to properly reflect such arm's length charge."

IRS recognizes the principle that if an adjustment was made to the income of one member of a controlled group that the corresponding adjustment must be made to the other member of the controlled group. In other words, if the taxable income of one member is increased, the taxable income of the other member must be reduced by the corresponding amount. In Technical

Information Release 838, dated August 2, 1966, Rev. Rul. 67-79, Cumulative Bulletin 1967-1, page 117, IRS said:

"In cases where, pursuant to the provisions of section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Service has made adjustments to allocate income or deductions among the members of a group of business entities owned or controlled by the same interests, corresponding adjustments must be made to the income or deductions of the related corporations from which the allocations were made."

In Rev. Rul. 67-79 IRS was explaining its acquiescence in the decision of the Tax Court of the United States in the case of Smith-Bridgman & Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 287 (1951), Acquiescence C.B. 1951-1, 3; and its position on the decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the case of Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 Fed.2d 508 (1940). In each of these cases, IRS had, under the authority of Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (predecessor of Sec. 482 of the 1954 Code), created

income where none existed under the provisions of Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. In the Smith-Bridgman & Co. case, the taxpayer made interest free loans to its parent company. IRS determined that Smith-Bridgman & Co. had taxable income equal to interest at 4% on these loans. However, IRS did not allow the parent company an offsetting adjustment for this interest expense.

In the Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. case, the taxpayer leased equipment to a controlled corporation rent free. IRS determined that the taxpayer corporation should include in its income \$12,000. rental income which it determined was the fair rental value of the equipment. However, IRS did not make the corresponding adjustment and allow the controlled corporation the \$12,000. rental expense. The last paragraph of Rev. Rul. 67-79, Page 118, says:

"The acquiescence in Smith-Bridgman & Co. was intended only to concur in the proposition that appropriate adjustments are to be made to the incomes of both members of the group affected to reflect the allocation. The acquiescence does not override the Service's position as to the scope and purpose of section 482 of the 1954 Code as set forth in existing regulations. Similarly, the Service concurs in the result reached in Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. only to the extent the holding is based on its failure to have made an appropriate adjustment to the income or deductions of the member of the group from which the allocation was made."

Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1) provides:

(b) Scope and purpose.

(1) The purpose of section 482 is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer. The interests controlling a group of controlled taxpayers are assumed to have complete power to cause each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and accounting records truly reflect the taxable income from the property and business of each of the controlled taxpayers. If, however, this has not been done, and the taxable incomes are thereby understated, the district director shall intervene, and, by making such distributions, apportionments, or allocations as he may

deem necessary of gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances, or of any item or element affecting taxable income, between or among the controlled taxpayers constituting the group, shall determine the true taxable income of each controlled taxpayer. The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.

IRS disallowed the rental deductions to the taxpayer because IRS contends that the payments which were made to the related corporation, TIERCO, were excessive and were not entered into in an arm's length transaction. In enacting Section 482, Congress intended to give IRS a weapon whereby they could allocate income and deductions among related taxpayers so that each would report its true net income. However, Congress wanted IRS to be fair about it and not disallow deductions to one related taxpayer where the correlative adjustment was not made to the other related taxpayer. This is exactly what IRS has done in this situation. Section 482 and the regulations

thereunder prohibit such action on the part of IRS. The rental deductions cannot be denied to the taxpayer when the rental income of TIERCO was not reduced by a corresponding sum.

The Government's position is that the disallowance of the rental expense was done under the provisions of Section 162. Section 162 is the general statute which provides that a business can deduct only ordinary and necessary expenses. If a taxpayer pays excessive rental to a related corporation, then the excess is not deductible under Section 162 because the excess is not an ordinary and necessary business expense.

However, in enacting Section 482, Congress has provided a fair remedy to the Government and to related taxpayers so that if a related taxpayer pays excess rentals that it will not be a "disallowed" deduction as far as the related group is concerned. Section 482 and the regulations thereunder

provides that the excess will not be deductible by the payor provided that the income of the related member receiving the excess is reduced by the excess amount. If IRS makes the correlative adjustment, then each member of the related group will report its correct taxable income. However, if IRS does not make the correlative adjustment, then Section 482 and the regulations thereunder provide that the excess rentals are deductible by the payor or the taxpayer in this case.

Taxpayer submits that it is not an easy matter to know when a rental contract is entered into the "fair rental value" of the item of personal property involved. This is an opinion matter and experts can and do differ as to their opinion. Also, an Internal Revenue Agent can have his opinion and regardless of his qualifications or no qualifications, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to prove him wrong. Therefore,

Congress, by enacting Section 482, wanted to insure that if the taxpayer guessed wrong or made a wrong decision as to the "fair rental value", that the related group would not pay tax on any more than the total net income of the group. IRS has not followed the mandate of Congress and its own regulations because it has disallowed as rental expense to the taxpayer the sum of \$74,224.08 and has not reduced the rental income of TIERCO by that sum. The net effect is that when this suit was filed was that IRS had taxed the related group of the taxpayer and TIERCO on \$74,224.08 more than their combined income. This the Government is not permitted to do under the provisions of Section 482.

As far as can be determined, this is the first time that the Government has taken the position that an excess deduction taken by a related member is allowable only under the provisions of Section 162. What

the Government is attempting to do is to eliminate Section 482 from the Internal Revenue Code. Congress is the one to eliminate a law and not IRS. Congress had a purpose in enacting Section 482 and it or its predecessors has been in the Internal Revenue Code for a long time. As stated by this Court in C. I. R. v. First Security Bank of Utah, 92 S.Ct. 1085, 405 U.S. 394, 31 L.Ed.2d 318 (1972), on page 1098, footnote 1:

"1. Section 482 is not new. It appeared as Section 45 of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 806, and has predecessors in Sec. 240(f) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 46, and in Section 240(d) of the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 288."

In C.I.R. v. First Security Bank of Utah, supra, which was a Section 482 case, at footnote 4, page 1089, this Court said:

"⁴ Taxpayers are, of course, generally free to structure their business affairs as they consider to be in their best interests, including, lawful structuring (which may include holding companies) to minimize taxes. Perhaps the classic example of this principle is Judge Learned Hand's comment in his dissenting

opinion in Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 818, 850-851 [35 AFTR 857] (CA2 1947):

"'Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.'"

Section 482 is a specific statute. Section 162 is a general statute. The specific statute should control over the general statute unless Congress has indicated a clear intention otherwise.

Monte Vista Lodge v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 384 F.2d 126, (C.A. 9, 1967) said on page 129:

". . . Fundamental maxims of statutory construction require that a specific section be found to qualify a general section. A specific statutory provision will govern even though general provisions, if standing alone, would include the same subject. Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir., 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891, 71 S.Ct. 206, 95 L.Ed. 646."

The facts were stipulated in the Trial Court.

The Trial Court found in its findings of fact that the Government disallowed a portion of the rental expense claimed by the taxpayer under the provisions of Section 162. Actually, this is a legal conclusion or the ultimate conclusion on which judgment was based in this case. There is no evidence to support such a conclusion. Taxpayer plead in his complaint that Section 482 was applicable. The Section 482 issue was preserved in the pre-trial order under "contested issues of law", which pre-trial order was approved by the parties and it was approved and entered by the Trial Court on September 2, 1977. The findings by the Trial Court that the Government used Section 162 is clearly erroneous and the ultimate legal conclusion in this case and is reviewable by this Court. United States

v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395; C.I.R. v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218, 80 S.Ct. 1190, C.I.R. v. Welch, 345 F.2d 939, (5 Cir., 1965), Chared Corporation, Transferee, v. U. S., 446 F.2d 745 (5 Cir., 1971).


It is the taxpayer's opinion that the issue which is presented in this case is of national importance in connection with income tax matters. Most large and medium sized businesses and many smaller businesses are structured so that there are related parties or businesses involved, and most of these businesses deal with one another where the provisions of Section 482 would come into play. Many of these businesses sell products to one another, rent equipment to one another and engage in numerous business activities between them. By the use of Section 482, these businesses know that if IRS determines that they did not enter into a transaction on an arm's

length basis and if IRS increases the income of one member that IRS must make a correlative adjustment and decrease the taxable income of the other member. However, if this case is allowed to stand, IRS will have swept away Section 482 from the Internal Revenue Code, and they will use Section 162 on these type of cases. This is going to leave uncertainty and confusion among related or controlled entities, and the litigation which this will entail will be endless.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant certiorari in this case and reverse the judgments of the Courts below.

Respectfully submitted,




Douglas E. Pope
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari and the separately bound Appendix on the several parties thereto as follows:


1. On the United States by mailing a copy in a duly addressed envelope with air mail postage prepaid to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. 20530, and by mailing a copy in a duly addressed envelope with air mail postage prepaid to the Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. 20530.

Dated on this the 12th day of September, 1978.



Dougal C. Pope

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES



NO. 78-442

OTM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITIONER'S APPENDICE FOR ITS
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

OTM CORPORATION, :
Plaintiff :
VS. : CIVIL NO. 70-H-145
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
Defendant.:

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This matter came on to be heard before
this Court sitting without a jury, and the
parties having by their pleadings and by
stipulations established the evidence,
this Court enters its findings of fact and
conclusions of law:

Findings of Fact

1. This is a suit brought by the
plaintiff, OTM Corporation, against the
United States of America, for a refund of

federal income taxes paid by OTM for its fiscal years ended September 30, 1955, through September 30, 1958, in the principal amount of \$53,646.44, plus a negligence penalty, assessed interest and statutory interest thereon.

2. Plaintiff is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Texas with its place of business at Houston, Texas. Defendant is the United States of America.

3. Originally, this case involved a number of issues concerning rental deductions claimed by the plaintiff of equipment which it rented from an associated company, Texas Industrial Equipment Rental Co. (TIERCO), and the deductibility of various miscellaneous items. The plaintiff has conceded that the Government properly assessed and collected the tax with respect to all of the miscellaneous items and they are no longer in issue in this action.

only the question of the proper rental deduction remains for consideration by the Court.

4. During the years at issue, the plaintiff, OTM, was owned 51 percent by J. C. Bradshaw, 48 percent by Kenneth Bradshaw, his adult son, and the remainder by others. TIERCO was owned one-third by J. C. Bradshaw, one-third by Kenneth Bradshaw, and one-third by James Hull, an independent C.P.A., who was the auditor for OTM.

5. During the years at issue, TIERCO rented equipment to OTM. The Government, following an audit of OTM's income tax return, disallowed a portion of the rental as a business deduction pursuant to Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 on ten of the items of equipment. The parties have agreed that the reasonable rental value of those items of the equipment in dispute was such that a

refund of federal tax in the amount of \$17,474, plus assessed interest, was proper and appropriate. This Court has examined the record and adopts the stipulation of the parties with respect to the reasonable rental value.

6. At the same time that the Government denied a deduction for excess rentals paid by OTM to TIERCO, it did not reduce TIERCO's income by an equal sum. At the time the assessment was made against OTM, the statute of limitations for assessment against and claims for refund by TIERCO had not yet run. The Government did not voluntarily reduce TIERCO's rental income and TIERCO took no legal action to claim a refund of amounts previously paid by it as taxes on rental income. Statutes of limitation on assessment against and claims for refund by TIERCO have, of course, since elapsed.

7. TIERCO paid some \$17,474. in

income tax by virtue of its receipt of income equal to the disallowed deductions for excessive rental expense to OTM.

8. The parties have agreed that the negligence penalty of five percent assessed against OTM will apply; however, the negligence penalty will not be applied to amounts refunded to OTM pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. Accordingly, with respect to the \$17,474. to be refunded to the plaintiff pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, there will also be a refund of \$654.00 in negligence penalty.

9. Any conclusion of law deemed to be a finding of fact is hereby adopted as the same.

Conclusions of Law

1. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties. Venue is proper and this lawsuit is properly brought in this Court.

2. Following the stipulation of the

parties on the reasonable rental value of the equipment and the concession by the plaintiff of the miscellaneous issues, there remains but one issue for decision by the Court: Whether the failure of the Government to reduce TIERCO's income by an amount equal to the disallowed deductions for OTM somehow prohibits the Government from disallowing those deductions to OTM. This issue requires brief reference to Sections 162 and 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.).

3. Section 162 allows a business to deduct the ordinary and necessary costs of conducting its business. Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States, 513 F.2d 800 (C.A. 5, 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975). With respect to rentals, only those sums which are reasonable in amount are allowed as a Section 162 deduction. Brown Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 436 (C.A. 5, 1958). It was pursuant to these prin-

ples that the Government, in its assessment, disallowed a portion of the deductions claimed by OTM for rental expense.

4. In a case involving two businesses which are controlled by the same interests, the Government has an alternative weapon--Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954--which allows it to allocate income and deductions amongst such businesses. The Government did not purport to use Section 482 in this case, although it might have done so. In cases involving Section 482 the Government is required to make a correlative adjustment. That is, if it were to disallow deductions to OTM, it would also have to reduce TIERCO's rental income by a like amount. Treasury Regulations on Income Tax (1954 Code), §1.482-1(d)(2) (26 C.F.R.). Here, OTM claims that, because the Government did not reduce TIERCO's income, it is somehow estopped from denying the deduction to OTM

on the basis of Section 162.

5. The law provides that Section 482 may be used only at the instance of the Government--it may not be claimed by a taxpayer nor can the Government be compelled to use the principles of Section 482 in a given circumstance. Treasury Regulations § 1.482-1(b) (3).

6. Accordingly, because the Government did not use Section 482 and cannot be compelled to, OTM cannot complain that TIERCO's income was not reduced, i.e., no correlative adjustment was made. The Government's assessment was made solely by virtue of the principles of Section 162 which do not require a correlative adjustment. In such a case, TIERCO might have (but did not choose to) filed a suit for a refund of taxes. If TIERCO had chosen to do so, its suit might well have been joined with that of OTM in order to obtain complete adjudication. However, there is

no requirement that the Government adjust TIERCO's income under the principles of Section 162; it was up to TIERCO to do something about it.

7. Accordingly, this Court concludes that OTM's point is not well taken. The Government, having made its assessment pursuant to Section 162 is entitled to prevail as to the disallowance of that portion of the rental expense over and above the stipulated fair rental value.

8. If any finding of fact is deemed to be a conclusion of law, it is hereby adopted as the same.

The parties are hereby directed to prepare a judgment in conformity with these findings of fact and conclusions of law and submit them to the Court for entry.

Done at Houston, Texas, this 30th day of September, 1977.

/s/ Woodrow Seals
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

OTM CORPORATION, :
: Plaintiff :
: VS. : CIVIL NO. 70-H-145
: :
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
: Defendant :

JUDGMENT

This matter having come on to be heard before the Court, sitting without a jury, and the Court having considered the stipulation of the parties, the pleadings, and the evidence, and having rendered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, in accordance therewith it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff, OTM, do have and recover of the defendant, United States of America, for its fiscal years ended September 30, 1955, through September 30, 1958, the sum of \$45,754., consisting of \$17,474. in prin-

cipal, penalty in the amount of \$654, assessed interest in the amount of \$2,189, and statutory interest thereon in the amount of \$25,440 to September 21, 1977, with statutory interest thereafter pursuant to law, and with each party to bear its own costs.

Done at Houston, Texas, this 30th day of September, 1977.

/s/ Woodrow Seals
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:

/s/ Dougal C. Pope
DOUGAL C. POPE
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Houston, Texas 77005

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

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By: /s/ Howard A. Weinberger
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APPENDIX B
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NO. 77-3200
Summary Calendar*

OTM CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.

(May 8, 1978)

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas

Before RONEY, GEE, AND FAY, Circuit
Judges

PER CURIAM: The judgment is affirmed on the
basis of the Findings of Facts and Conclusions
of Law of the District Court annexed hereto.

Appendix to follow

*Rule 18, 5 Cir.; See Isbell Enterprises,
Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York,
et al, 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, part 1.

OTM CORPORATION VS. UNITED STATES
Appendix

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

OTM CORPORATION, :
: Plaintiff, :
: VS. : CIVIL NO. 70-H-145
: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
: Defendant. :
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This matter came on to be heard before
this Court sitting without a jury, and the
parties having by their pleadings and by
stipulations established the evidence, this
Court enters its findings of fact and con-
clusions of law:

Findings of Fact

1. This is a suit brought by the

plaintiff, OTM Corporation, against the United States of America, for a refund of federal income taxes paid by OTM for its fiscal years ended September 30, 1955, through September 30, 1958, in the principal amount of \$53,646.44, plus a negligence penalty, assessed interest and statutory interest thereon.

2. Plaintiff is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Texas with its place of business at Houston, Texas. Defendant is the United States of America.

3. Originally, this case involved a number of issues concerning rental deductions claimed by the plaintiff of equipment which it had rented from an associated company, Texas Industrial Equipment Rental Co. (TIERCO), and the deductibility of various miscellaneous items. The plaintiff has conceded that the Government property assessed and collected the tax

with respect to all of the miscellaneous items and they are no longer in issue in this action. Only the question of the proper rental deduction remains for consideration by the Court.

4. During the years at issue, the plaintiff, OTM, was owned 51 percent by J. C. Bradshaw, 48 percent by Kenneth Bradshaw, his adult son, and the remainder by others. TIERCO was owned one-third by J. C. Bradshaw, one-third by Kenneth Bradshaw, and one-third by James Hull, an independent C.P.A., who was the auditor for OTM.

5. During the years at issue, TIERCO rented equipment to OTM. The Government, following an audit of OTM's income tax return, disallowed a portion of the rental as a business deduction pursuant Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 on ten of the items of equipment. The parties have agreed that the reasonable

rental value of those items of the equipment in dispute was such that a refund of federal tax in the amount of \$17,474, plus assessed interest, was proper and appropriate. This Court has examined the record and adopts the stipulation of the parties with respect to the reasonable rental value.

6. At the same time that the Government denied a deduction for excess rentals paid by OTM to TIERCO, it did not reduce TIERCO's income by an equal sum. At the time the assessment was made against OTM, the statute of limitations for assessment against and claims for refund by TIERCO had not yet run. The Government did not voluntarily reduce TIERCO's rental income and TIERCO took no legal action to claim a refund of amounts previously paid by it as taxes on rental income. Statutes of limitation on assessment against and claims for refund by TIERCO have, of course, since

elapsed.

7. TIERCO paid some \$17,474 in income tax by virtue of its receipt of income equal to the disallowed deductions for excessive rental expense to OTM.

8. The parties have agreed that the negligence penalty of five percent assessed against OTM will apply; however, the negligence penalty will not be applied to amounts refunded to OTM pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. Accordingly, with respect to the \$17,474 to be refunded to the plaintiff pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, there will also be a refund of \$654.00 in negligence penalty.

9. Any conclusion of law deemed to be a finding of fact is hereby adopted as the same.

Conclusions of Law

1. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties. Venue is proper and this lawsuit is properly

brought in this Court.

2. Following the stipulation of the parties on the reasonable rental value of the equipment and the concession by the plaintiff of the miscellaneous issues, there remains but one issue for decision by the Court: Whether the failure of the Government to reduce TIERCO's income by an amount equal to the disallowed deductions for OTM somehow prohibits the Government from disallowing those deductions to OTM. This issue requires brief reference to Sections 162 and 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.).

3. Section 162 allows a business to deduct the ordinary and necessary costs of conducting its business. Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States, 513 F.2d 800 (C.A. 5, 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 362, 46 L.Ed.2d 281 (1975). With respect to rentals, only those sums which are reasonable in amount are allowed as a

Section 162 deduction. Brown Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 436 (C.A. 5, 1958). It was pursuant to these principles that the Government, in its assessment, disallowed a portion of the deduction claimed by OTM for rental expense.

4. In a case involving two businesses which are controlled by the same interests, the Government has an alternative weapon--Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954--which allows it to allocate income and deductions amongst such businesses. The Government did not purport to use Section 482 in this case, although it might have done so. In cases involving Section 482 the Government is required to make a correlative adjustment. That is, if it were to disallow deductions to OTM, it would also have to reduce TIERCO's rental income by a like amount. Treasury Regulations on Income Tax (1954 Code), §1.482-1(d)(2) (26 C.F.R.). Here, OTM claims that,

because the Government did not reduce TIERCO's income, it is somehow estopped from denying the deductions to OTM on the basis of Section 162.

5. The law provides that Section 482 may be used only at the instance of the Government--it may not be claimed by a taxpayer nor can the Government be compelled to use the principles of Section 482 in a given circumstance. Treasury Regulations §1.482-1(b) (3).

6. Accordingly, because the Government did not use Section 482 and cannot be compelled to, OTM cannot complain that TIERCO's income was not reduced, i. e., no correlative adjustment was made. The Government's assessment was made solely by virtue of the principles of Section 162 which do not require a correlative adjustment. In such a case, TIERCO might have (but did not choose to) filed a suit for a refund of taxes. If TIERCO had chosen to

do so, its suit might well have been joined with that of OTM in order to obtain complete adjudication. However, there is no requirement that the Government adjust TIERCO's income under the principles of Section 162; it was up to TIERCO to do something about it.

7. Accordingly, this Court concludes that OTM's point is not well taken. The Government, having made its assessment pursuant to Section 162 is entitled to prevail as to the disallowance of that portion of the rental expense over and above the stipulated fair rental value.

8. If any finding of fact is deemed to be a conclusion of law, it is hereby adopted as the same.

The parties are hereby directed to prepare a judgment in conformity with these findings of fact and conclusions of law and submit them to the Court for entry.

Done at Houston, Texas, this 30 day of

September, 1977.

/s/ Woodrow Seals
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NO. S77-3200

OTM CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas

(June 27, 1978)

Before RONEY, GEE, AND FAY, Circuit Judges

BY THE COURT:

It is ordered that appellant's motion
for leave to file petition for rehearing
out of time is GRANTED and, upon consider-
ation, the petition for rehearing is denied.

/s PHR

6/8/78 /s G

/s VLF

APPENDIX C

Statutes Involved

26 U.S.C. 482 provides:

Sec. 482. Allocation of income and deductions among taxpayers.

In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distributions, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.

26 U.S.C. 162 provides:

Sec. 162. Trade or business expenses.

(a) In general.--There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including--

* * * *

(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of pro-

perty to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.

* * * *

Regulations Involved

Reg. §1.482-1(b) (1) provides:

(b) Scope and purpose.

(1) The purpose of section 482 is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer. The interests controlling a group of controlled taxpayers are assumed to have complete power to cause each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and accounting records truly reflect the taxable income from the property and business of each of the controlled taxpayers. If, however, this has not been done, and the taxable incomes are thereby understated, the district director shall intervene, and, by making such distributions, apportionments, or allocations as he may deem necessary of gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances, or of any item or element affecting taxable income, between or among the controlled taxpayers constituting the group, shall determine the true taxable income of each controlled taxpayer. The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.

Reg. §1.482-1(b)(2) provides:

(2) Whenever the district director makes adjustments to the income of one member of a group of controlled taxpayers (such adjustments being referred to in this paragraph as "primary" adjustments) he shall also make appropriate correlative adjustments to the income of any other member of the group involved in the allocation....

Reg. §1.482-2(c) provides:

(c) Use of tangible property.

(1) General rule.

Where possession, use, or occupancy of tangible property owned or leased by one member of a group of controlled entities (referred to in this paragraph as the owner) is transferred by lease or other arrangement to another member of such group (referred to in this paragraph as the user) without charge or at a charge which is not equal to an arm's length rental charge (as defined in subdivision (i) of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph), the district director may make appropriate allocations to properly reflect such arm's length charge....

* * * *

(2) Arm's length charge.

(i) For the purposes of this paragraph, an arm's length rental charge shall be the amount of rent which was charged, or would have been charged for the use of the same or similar property, during the time it was in use, in in-

dependent transactions with or between unrelated parties under similar circumstances considering the period and location of the use, the owner's investment in the property or rent paid for the property....

Reg. §1.482-1(a)(6) provides:

The term "true taxable income" means, in the case of a controlled taxpayer, the taxable income (or, as the case may be, any item or element affecting taxable income) which would have resulted to the controlled taxpayer, had it in the conduct of its affairs (or, as the case may be, in the particular contract, transaction, arrangement, or other act) dealt with the other member or members of the group at arm's length. It does not mean the income, the deductions, the credits, the allowances, or the item or elements of income, deductions, credits, or allowances, resulting to the controlled taxpayer by reason of the particular contract, transaction, or arrangement, the controlled taxpayer, or the interests controlling it, chose to make (even though such contract, transaction, or arrangement be legally binding upon the parties thereto).

Reg. §1.482-1(c) provides:

Application. Transactions between one controlled taxpayer and another will be subjected to special scrutiny to ascertain whether the common control is being used to reduce, avoid, or escape taxes. In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the district director is not restricted

to the case of improper accounting, to the case of a fraudulent, colorable, or sham transaction, or to the case of a device designed to reduce or avoid tax by shifting or distorting income, deductions, credits, or allowances. The authority to determine true taxable income extends to any case in which either by inadvertence or design the taxable income, in whole or in part, of a controlled taxpayer, is other than it would have been had the taxpayer in the conduct of his affairs been an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another controlled taxpayer.

No. 78-442

Supreme Court U.S.
FILED

NOV 14 1978

MICHAEL R. OAK, JR., CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1978

OTM CORPORATION, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION

WADE H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-442

OTM CORPORATION, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION**

Petitioner seeks review of the decision of both courts below that amounts that it paid to a related corporation, Texas Industrial Equipment Rental Co. (TIERCO),¹ for the rental of equipment are not deductible for federal income tax purposes to the extent they exceeded the fair rental value of the equipment. Petitioner does not deny that the rentals in question in fact exceeded fair value (Pet. App. 3-A to 4-A). It nevertheless contends that the Commissioner is required to accept deductions for payments made to related parties unless he invokes his authority under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allocate income or deductions between such related entities and makes the "correlative adjustments"

¹J.C. Bradshaw and Kenneth Bradshaw owned controlling interests in both corporations (Pet. App. 3-A).

provided by Treasury Regulations on Income Tax, Section 1.482-1(d)(2) (26 C.F.R.). Under those provisions, whenever adjustments are made to the income of one member of a group of commonly-controlled taxpayers under Section 482, "appropriate correlative adjustments" to the income of other members of the controlled group may also be required. Here, however, the Commissioner did not invoke his authority under Section 482, and therefore did not make any correlative adjustments to TIERCO's income. Nor did TIERCO seek a reduction of its own income for the period in question by filing an amended return or claim for refund as it might have done within the applicable statutory period of limitations (Pet. App. 4-A).

Petitioner argues (Pet. 17-22) that the Commissioner's failure to proceed under Section 482 and to make a correlative adjustment to TIERCO's gross income precludes disallowance of the claimed deductions. But the scope of the Commissioner's authority under Section 482 is irrelevant to the question presented—whether petitioner is entitled to a rental deduction in the first instance under Section 162. As this Court has stated, "a taxpayer seeking a deduction must be able to point to an applicable statute and show that he comes within its terms." *New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering*, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Petitioner has failed to do so.

It is well established that a business expense can be deducted under Section 162 only if it is "reasonable in amount." *Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States*, 513 F. 2d 800, 804 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975). The requirements of Section 162 apply alike to taxpayers that are members of commonly-controlled groups and to those that are not. Where, as here, a taxpayer seeks to deduct a payment that is unreasonable in amount or otherwise fails

to meet the requirements of Section 162, the deduction may be disallowed for that reason alone, without resort to the Commissioner's authority under Section 482, even though the payment is to a related entity. See *Tulia Feedlot, supra*, 513 F. 2d at 806; *Brown Printing Co. v. Commissioner*, 255 F. 2d 436, 438-440 (5th Cir. 1958). Since it is undisputed that the rentals in this case were excessive, the deductions in question are not permitted under Section 162, and were properly disallowed.

Moreover, petitioner's argument that the Commissioner is required to proceed under Section 482 in the case of deductions for payments to related taxpayers finds no support either in the statutory language or in the case law. Indeed, as the district court observed (Pet. App. 8-A), this contention is squarely contrary to Section 1.482-1(b)(3) of the Regulations, which specifically provides that, "Section 482 grants no right to a controlled taxpayer to apply its provisions at will, nor does it grant any right to compel the district director to apply such provisions."

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.
Solicitor General

NOVEMBER 1978